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Abstract
Assessing potential uptake of agri-environmental schemes based on farm and farmer characteristics
only results in an incomplete analysis because it neglects the effects of motivational issues of the
institutional design of contracts, as set up by the government, and of social capital. In this paper we
describe contract choice using a trivariate probit model and taking into account farm and farmer
characteristics and motivational issues. Motivational issues in this study include the perception of
institutional design, the use of extension services, trust in the government, and preferences for stable
policies. Results show that besides farm and farmer characteristics these factors are important for the
likelihood of enrolling in agri-environmental contracts. They do not influence every contract type in the
same way and further decisions to conclude different contract types are connected. If farmers perceive
the design of an agri-environmental scheme as weak or favour a stable policy they are less likely to
conclude contracts for biodiversity protection. Farmers who do not trust the government are less likely to
conclude contracts for less intensive practices. Involvement in general networks increases the probability
of contracting for wildlife and landscape management and less intensive practices whereas this factor is
not important for biodiversity protection. The results suggest that taking into account motivational issues
and differentiating towards different contract types can increase effectiveness and efficiency of agri-
environmental schemes.
Additional keywords: agricultural policy, agri-environmental scheme, contract choice, motivation, trivariate
probit modelling
Introduction
Preserving nature and landscape, the quality ofwater, soil, air, and the typical rural
landscapes is one of the major contemporary challenges for developed countries.
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Agriculture and forestry, occupying most of the rural area throughout Europe,
are activities that have a major influence on the European rural environment and
landscape. The European countryside is mainly man-made, resulting from centuries of
management of rural areas for production of food, feed, raw materials, and ornamental
plants. As long as agricultural operations were relatively small in scale, before
mechanization, scale enlargement, and the increased use of external inputs, there was a
degree of harmony between agriculture and the countryside in which it operated.
After 1960, the rising cost oflabour induced labour-saving and production-
enhancing techniques that increased agricultural output and helped the dwindling
numbers of farmers achieve income levels comparable to those outside the agricultural
sector (Oskam & Slangen, 1998). It resulted in a strong mechanization, intensification
ofland use, strong specialization, farm and scale enlargement and increased use of
non-factor inputs, such as concentrates, compound feed, fertilizers and pesticides. The
side effects of these changes have led to a threatening of the quality of water, soil, air,
nature and landscape.
While agriculture was experiencing these developments, at the demand side higher
incomes and levels ofwelfare increased the demand for wildlife and landscape, as well
as leisure and outdoor recreation. Changes in demand co-determine changes in the
institutional environment. This implies that during a period of economic growth and
the associated evolution of societal preferences, the rules of the game for the agricultural
sector change. For example, ownership or property rights with respect to the environment
or landscape, which were traditionally part of agriculture, are now being contested.
Farmers have to adapt themselves not only to changed price signals, but also to a new
institutional arrangement giving agriculture its proper place in society. The introduction
of agri-environmental schemes (AESs) in the EU-member states is one of the changes in
the rules of the game for the agricultural sector in the last 30 years.
In the European Union, the introduction ofAESs was generally meant to promote a
more environmentally friendly way of farming. However, AESs influence the behaviour
of individual farmers in different ways, which can even be different from the intended
ones. First, not all eligible farmers conclude agri-environmental contracts. Second,
farmers might be more interested in the payments and could be trying to minimize
their effort or even not to comply with their contracts in the correct way. To be able
to design more effective and efficient contracts, policy makers (EU, national, or local)
aiming at improving the agri-environment have an interest in the reasons why farmers
choose a specific agri-environmental contract.
The purpose of this paper is to explain the factors that determine famers' motivation
for the uptake ofAESs, taking into account the institutional design of contracts and the
level of social capital. The institutional design of contracts that is relevant for farmers
differs across member states and regions in the European Union.
The first question is whether contract choice depends on farmers' preferences about
institutional design of contracts. Designing a contract is a complex task (Bogetoft &
Olesen, 2002). Governments have to choose from a spectrum of alternative elements
of design such as eligibility rules, procedures for application, and administration
requirements. Bogetoft & Olesen (2002) observed that contract parties often design
contracts without using contract theory. Instead, the design of a contract is based on
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experience and a process of trial and error. Farmers have their own perception of the
choices the government makes. If institutional design is perceived as not appropriate,
farmers are expected to be less likely to conclude any contract even if the operational
opportunity costs of implementing the measures are negligible. Institutional design
that fits a transaction adds to the value of a contract whereas inappropriate design
lowers the value of a contract for the farmer. Depending on the information they have,
farmers could perceive institutional design differently. Therefore the role of public and
private extension in AES needs to be taken into account.
The second question is what is the role of social capital for the uptake of an AES?
Social capital manifests itself in participation in agricultural and social networks and
trust in government and society. Trust can complement government control and
reduce transaction costs for both the farmer and the government. Trust is an important
component of social capital.
In this paper we shall describe the motivation for different AES contract types,
using a trivariate probit model where farmers can choose one, two or three types of
contract, either separately or simultaneously. Perceived institutional design, extension
services, social capital, and farmers' characteristics are expected to influence these
choices differently because transaction characteristics are different.
The paper is structured as follows. The next chapter examines theoretically the
contractual arrangements and the choice of different contract types. Moreover, the role
of institutional factors in explaining contract choice is discussed. Then the empirical
model is discussed and an overview of the data is presented. In the chapter thereafter
the results from the analysis of the contractual arrangement and the estimation results
and their interpretation are assessed. The last chapter concludes.
Motivations for agri-environmental measures at the farm level
Motivations and contract choice
Any transaction of the type 'You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours' - or as a quid
pro quo - can be considered as a form of contract. If there is a long-term relation
or a long duration between purchase and delivery (quid and quo), a contract is an
essential element of the transaction relation (Hart & Holmstrom, 1987). A contract is
a commitment to an enforceable mutual agreement recognized by non-interested third
parties. Generally, a contract specifies the actions each party will take (for example
the delivery of a good or service by one party and the payment to be made by the other
party) and may assign decision-making powers (see for instance FitzRoy et a!', 1998).
Motivation questions arise because individuals have their own private interests,
which seldom correspond perfectly to the interests of other parties, the group to which
the individuals belong or society as a whole. Such problems arise because specific
plans cannot be described in a complete enforceable contract (Milgrom & Roberts,
1992). Concerning motivation, many contracts contain a steering mechanism that
defines performance criteria and the means to measure performance. Motivation is
also included in the specification of a reward structure that marks the level of payment
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if a minimum level of performance is attained. In the psychological literature it is
argued that there are two kinds of motivation: (I) internal or intrinsic to the individual
concerned, and (2) external or extrinsic (Le Grand, 2003). The feelings to do your work
well does every so often not arise from external motivation like payments or direct
commands but can be viewed as a form of internal motivation. It is also argued that
there may be a trade-off between the two kinds of motivation, such that too heavy
emphasis on extrinsic motivation can drive out internal motivation. So motivations
activated by external factors, such as monetary incentives or direct order (as in
hierarchical governance structure), can crowd out motivations that are internal to the
individual (which mayor may not include altruistic motivations) (Le Grand, 2003).
Several studies apply principal-agent theory to analyse the design ofagri-
environmental contracts focusing on hidden information and hidden actions (e.g.,
Ozanne et a!', 2001; White, 2002). Other studies focus on the characteristics of farms and
farmers who conclude agri-environmental contracts (e.g., Crabtree et a!', 1998; Beedell
& Rehman, 2000; Wynn et a!', 2001; Vanslembrouck et a!', 2002; Van Wenum, 2002).
Van Huylenbroeck et a!. (2000) developed a simulation model to evaluate the impact of
agri-environmental programmes on production, management and economic results of
dairy farms. Peedings & Polman (2004) used a micro-econometric model to model agri-
environmental contract choice. In their study they took into account transaction costs
involved in contract choice. Compared with these studies we introduce the factors that are
important for internal motivation, i.e., public and private extension services, trust in the
government, perceived institutional design of contracts, and social capital.
Parties to a contract will choose to conclude or to renew a contract if the expected
gains from doing so are greater than those of organizing the transaction in some other
way or having no transaction at all (e.g., Masten, 1996; Masten & Saussier, 2002), or
formally written as:
G'k ~ Gi, if Vi> Vl, and
~ Gj, if Vi "" Vl
(I)
where Gi represents contract type i, Gj an alternative contract type j, Vi and Vl (the
farmers beliefs about) the corresponding values of contract type i and alternative j, and
G" represents the contract type actually chosen.
Implementing an AES contract on a farm means that the farmer supplies a service
to society where the government is the procurer of the service. Because the returns
farmers expect are difficult to observe, a testable theory of contracting requires that
the theory relates the benefits and costs of contract types to observable features of the
transaction (Masten & Saussier, 2002). Therefore, the following relations are added to
Equation I:
Vi ~ Vi(x,ei)
Vl ~ Vl(x,ej)
(2)
(3)
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where x represents a vector ofobservable attributes affecting the motivations for enrolling
in a specific contract, and ei and ej represent error terms that may reflect either variables
NJAS 55-4, 2008
Institutional design of agri-environmental contracts in the European Union: the role of trust and social capital
omitted (like farm income or attitudes offarmers towards farming (Jongeneel et a!', 2008)
or misperceptions on the part of the contract parties about the true values of Vi and Vi.
The model refers to two different contracts but can be extended to three or
more. Farmers choose (a combination of) contract(s) if the gains from doing so are
greater than those from another (combination of) contracts(s). Farmers can decide
simultaneously whether to conclude one or more contracts. The explanatory variables of
Equations 2 and 3 influence all these decisions.
Public and private extension services
The importance of providing farmers with information through agricultural extension
services (e.g., on AES scheme objectives, eligibility, criteria) has been identified as vital
with regard to shaping farmers' attitude towards AESs and their traditional farming
practices, and to agricultural knowledge systems of rural communities. In particular,
the way in which a farmer finds out about a scheme and how the scheme is 'sold' by
street-level bureaucrats plays an important role in the successful uptake of schemes and
in the way schemes are viewed by farmers (Wilson & Hart, 2001).
Morris et a!' (2000) show that many arable farmers offered the generic type of
resistance to agro-environmental schemes often in association with objection in
principle to perceived constraints on freedom to farm, which was strengthened by
lack of knowledge of the scheme. Furthermore, there were quite a number of non-
participants whose potential enrolment was constrained by inadequate or incorrect
information. Public and private extension services can help to overcome these
information asymmetries. Morris et al. (2000) argue that participation can be enhanced
by a purposeful promotion campaign and possible modification of scheme design. In
our study we distinguish between both types of extension services because their role
is different. Public extension services can be expected to inform farmers in a different
way because they are connected to policy. Public extension may lead to lower costs,
for example farmers may have a better understanding ofwhat is required from them
(see Falconer, 2000). Private extension services are often linked to organizations like
suppliers, processing industries, fiscal advisors, and banks. Private extension focuses
for instance on the improvement of dairy production or are dealing with investments.
Trust in government and institutional design
The use of contracts will serve different purposes. In some cases contracts may be
used chiefly to assure technical compliance with needs. In other cases contracts may
seek to control opportunism or shirking. It is clear that in either case a level of trust
may also be required in order to establish a relationship at all, before a contract could
be used (Bennet & Robson, 2004). In general, the economic function of trust refers
to the reduction of transaction costs and its influence on promoting co-operation and
reducing the need (costs) for intervention to prevent or correct dishonesty (e.g., James
& Sykuta, 2005). Klein-Woolthuis et al. (2005) give three interpretations of trust. First,
within transaction cost economics and contract theory, contracts are a basis for trust.
Contracting partners are limited, because they have no other option than to behave
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trustworthily (opportunism will be at the expense of sanctions). Here contract and trust
are positively related with contract as a prerequisite for trust. Second, social scientists
often envisage contracts as being in conflict with trust. Third, contracts can be negatively
related with trust, thereby decreasing or eliminating the need for control or contracts
(Klein-Woolthuis, 1999; Nooteboom, zooz). In this paper we adopt a narrow definition
of trust entailing the expectation that the government will not engage in opportunistic
behaviour, even in the face of opportunities and incentives for opportunism, irrespective
of the ability to monitor or control farmers (see also Klein Woolthuis et a!., zooS). This
definition is felt to indicate what most people would call 'real trust'.
Motivation of farmers to participate in AESs can also be derived from
trustworthiness and reputation of the government. AESs are contracts between farmers
and the government and contracts are a two-sided mechanism. Both parties have to
build up reputation and trust. A low level of trust of farmers in the government or
a low reputation of the government has important consequences for the uptake of
contracts. Important in this context is time inconsistency (Kydland & Prescott, 1977).
This phenomenon, which can be considered as a kind of hidden action, refers to a
government's propensity to modify policy or the rules of the game of the institutional
environment, and people's awareness of the likelihood and implications of this. It
affects commitment and creates a negative influence on the uptake of contracts,
especially long-term ones.
Yang & Holzer (zo06) discuss a number of arguments that could lead to difficulties
in analysing the link between the performance of governments and trust in these
governments. Applying these arguments to AESs leads to the following dimensions of
trust between farmers and the government: (I) Farmers may have different expectations
ofwhat kind of AES the government should provide. As a result, their reactions to
the same level of actual performance with respect to the institutional quality ofAES
design may be very different. It is not the actual performance that matters but the gap
between expectation and performance. (z) Farmers may have negative perceptions
regardless of how government is actually performing. (3) Government performance is
produced collectively by a number of agencies but some agencies feature more strongly
in farmers' image of government, like for instance the parliament. (4) Performance
with respect to AESs is not the only criterion that farmers use to evaluate government.
(5) For some issues bad governance leads to distrust but good governance tends to go
unnoticed. Although these aspects have relevance, surveys show that citizens are able to
assess the performance of public services in a rather objective way, without constantly
referring to stereotypes.
Trust in government, parliament, or the civil service has received increased
attention in recent years (Bouckart & Van Der Walle, zo03). These authors show that
there may always be a certain cultural/political bias in trust attributes. The factors
determining trust in government are not necessarily the same for every country
or political culture and may vary over time. Several studies have shown that the
institutional environment matters for the variability of contracts in relation to their
transactions, that there are different arrangements in the same environment, and that
the institutional environment influences the performance and duration of contracts
(e.g., Menard, zooo). It is not easy to obtain measures of relevant dimensions of the
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institutional environment in order to isolate its impact on institutional arrangements
(e.g., Oxley, 1999). For a country, trust in the administration responsible for
AESs indicates congruence between farmers' preferences and the perceived actual
functioning of the government in that country.
Assessment of AE S contract requirements and of the effects of the contracts in
terms of uptake and environmental effectiveness merely results in an incomplete
analysis because it assumes that the design of the AES programme as set up by the
European Union and national government is optimal. In this paper we shall focus on
the perception of institutional design by farmers as explanatory factor for the uptake
ofAE Ss. Perceptions are used because farmers only observe part of the institutional
design. If farmers perceive that the institutional design of contracts is weak they are
less likely to conclude agri-environmental contracts.
Self-interest and social capital
Building-in self-interest means that people are doing things that are of interest
to themselves. Such interests can vary from financial benefits to responsible
entrepreneurship. The understanding of responsible entrepreneurship is fully on the move
and is related to a varied and complex phenomenon. In general, self-interest can be
understood to mean that a farmer should not only think in terms of the economic
value of the firm (mostly represented by the profit of the farm). He should also
consider social and ecological values as a result of the farm's activities in terms of
social and ecological quantities. This is indicated by the 'Triple-P bottom line'. The
three P's stand for People, Planet and Profit, i.e., the extent to which farms are able
to realize sustainable developments from an economic (Profit), ecological (Planet),
and societal (People) point of view. From this viewpoint, farms function in a socially
responsible manner (responsible entrepreneurship) if the economic, social and ecological
values that they produce fulfil the expectations of the stakeholders. Satisfying the
social and ecological criteria actually creates a 'permit' to carry out farming activities
(Van Huylenbroeck & Slangen, 2003). Concerning the social aspect of responsible
entrepreneurship, farmers participating in social networks like sports clubs or clubs
focused on community work are often more likely to participate because of their values.
This can be driven by internal motives or social capital.
Social capital is "the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and
expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals bring to a
recurrent activity" (Ostrom, 2000). Trust is perhaps the most important component
of social capital. If one's confidence in an enforcement agency falters, one does not
trust people to fulfil their agreements and agreements are not entered into (Dasgupta,
2000). In addition to trust, other elements of social capital include social norms,
or behavioural strategies subscribed to by everyone in society, and networks of civic
engagement (e.g., membership of a swimming club or religious community) that
enhance co-operation. Higher participation in societal activities, such as being a passive
- but especially an active - member of (agricultural or non-agricultural) organizations
are indicators for higher levels of social capital (e.g., Beugelsdijk, 2003). Social capital
could lead to lower transaction costs or change attitudes towards the agri-environment.
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An example can be found in Landcare group networks in Australia. The concept of
social capital explains, at least in part, the apparent success of such networks (e.g.,
Sobels et a!., 2001).
The literature is far from unambiguous and consistent in defining social capital
for empirical analysis (Beugelsdijk, 2003). For this reason we have to specify social
capital. In this paper we shall use the individual level of social capital. At the individual
level social capital relates to network resources and is thought of as a set of resources
embedded in relationships (Beugelsdijk, 2003). At the individual level, trust is an
element that is necessary for the existence of social capital. Several studies have shown
the importance of trust in a society for economic transactions (Beugelsdijk, 2003). This
type of trust is different from trust in a contracting partner where trust is focused on a
single person or organization like the government.
Group membership is the second element of social capital included in this paper.
The economic function of associational activity contains two elements (Beugelsdijk,
2003). The first element refers to the concept of collective action and argues that
organized group behaviour leads to the generally shared idea that the pursuit of
collective goods is not seen as contradictory to the achievement of personal wealth.
Associational activity limits the costs of free riding. The second element, embeddedness
in networks (group membership), promotes the spillover of knowledge and information
between the different actors involved. Farmer networking could be important to the
overall running costs of AESs (e.g., Falconer, 2000). Falconer (2000) argues, for
example, that scheme participation may be promoted by friends and neighbours, which
may also have a positive impact in terms of allowing reduction in the public costs of
scheme promotion. Examples of such networks are environmental co-operatives in the
Netherlands, in which farmers exchange information and are collectively involved in
AESs. Some networks are not only for exchanging information but are in fact part of
an institutional arrangement to participate in AESs and are therefore not exogenous
like groups of farmers involved in contracting AESs. In this paper we look at the
participation in groups of farmers who do focus on improving agriculture practices that
are not directly linked to AESs.
Empirical model and data
The econometric method applied to the aforementioned theoretical model is a trivariate
probit model. This technique (Capellari & Jenkins, 2003; Greene, 2003) enables us
to model farmers' decisions to take up more than one contract at a time. Since the
outcomes are treated as binary variables, any combination of contracts is possible. The
contracts can be complements rather than just substitutes. Unlike the multinomial
model the equation can vary across outcomes. The multivariate model applies
when several decisions may be interdependent or may depend on a common set of
explanatory variables:
420
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where v" Vz and v3 are binary variables; X" Xz and X3 are explanatory variables; f3" f3z
and f3
3
are regression coefficients; 10" Ez and 103 are error terms.
This three-equation model is featured by correlated disturbances, which (due
to identification reasons) are assumed to follow a normal distribution (variance is
normalized to unity). That is:
E[Er ] ~ E[Ez] ~ E[E3]~ °
COV[Er, Ez, 103]~ P ~ {Pr,z' Pr,y pz,y}
var[ lOr] ~ var[ Ez] ~ var[ 103] ~ I
(5)
where P is a vector of correlation parameters denoting the extent to which the error
terms co-vary. Should covariation be the case, we need to estimate the three equations
jointly, following a trivariate normal distribution: {E" Ez, E3} ~ 1fJ3 (0, 0, 0, I, I, I, pl.
As long as we are interested in simultaneous decisions, we need to define the joint
probability. For example, the probability of observing the three decisions taking place at
the same time (vr ~ I, Vz ~ I, V3~ I) would be:
Vr U2. u3
Pr(vr ~ I, Vz ~ I, V3~ I) ~ fff1fJ3(Xrif3" Xzif3z" X3if3y p)dErdEzdE3~ (6)
1fJ3(Xrif3" Xzif3z" X3i f3y p)dErdEzdE3
As in the standard probit model, observations contribute some combination ofPr( 'I'k ~ I)
for k{I,z,3}, depending on their specific values on those variables. The log-likelihood
is then just a sum across the eight possible contracting variables (that is, eight
possible combinations of successes (vk ~ I) and failures (vk ~ 0) times their associated
probabilities (Greene, zo03). These probabilities may be drawn from Equation (6) as
well. The most relevant coefficients estimated in the model are f3" f3z' f33and P(Pr,z' Pr,y
PZ,3)' The latter, if significantly different from 0, will evaluate to which extent each pair
of decisions is interrelated. The Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane simulator (GHK) is used
to approximate those integrals. See Capellari & Jenkins (zo03) and Greene (zo03) for a
brief description of the GHK.
Data
In zooS' face-to-face surveys were carried out in the following areas: Fryslan (the
Netherlands), Flanders (Belgium), Czech Republic, Finland, Basse-Normandie (France),
and Emilia Romagna (I taly). A total of 990 farmers were interviewed. In order to obtain
better information on agri-environmental contracts, contracting farmers were willfully
over-represented in the sample. In the Netherlands and France grassland was the most
important form ofland use, in Belgium it was a mixture of grassland and arable land,
and in Finland and Italy arable land was most important. The questionnaire used
addressed issues concerning the farm, the farmer's perception of agri-environmental
contracts, information on income, social capital, motivational issues and hobbies.
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Table 1. Data for the average farm in 2005 (n ~ 990).
Variable
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Contracting type
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Farm characteristics
Specialization dairy farming
Specialization beef farming
Farm size
Trajectory
Future
Intensity
Farmer characteristics
Age between 40 and 55, and
age older than 55
Medium education and
high education
Off-farm income
Extension services
Public extension
Private extension
Description
° ~ no contract
I ~ landscape management (area based)
2 ~ biodiversity protection
3 ~ restriction of intensive practices
Farm type dairy (percentage SGM 2 in dairy).
Farm type beef cattle (percentage SGM in beef
production (grazing cattle).
Farm size (total number ofSGM x IOOO).
Dynamics in current farming (number of changes
in farming practices not related to AES).
Future of farm (dummy indicating whether farm
is expected to be continued in the next IO years).
Intensity offarm (measured in SGM per hal.
Dummy age farm head between 40 and 55 and
older than 55 (age of farm head or average age
in case of more than one farm head).
Dummy education medium level and high level
(education of farm head or highest education
in case of more farm heads).
Dummy off-farm labour income (off-farm
employment) is more than 50%.
Dummy indicating that farmer often receives public
extension.
Dummy indicating that farmer often receives private
extension.
Average SD I
0.16
0.26
0.25
29.81 3°.02
1.72 5·Il
14.64 4 2.76
3.25 1.85
0.87
0·37 1.64
0.23/0 .5°
0.80/0.14
0.13
0.60
0.66
422
Trust in government and institutional design
Trust government Dummy indicating that 'The can be trusted' where 0.64
..... stands for agricultural administration, environmental
administration, or EU (average score of Likert scales).
Institutional design Average score on six items on a Likert scale related to 2.58 0.49
institutional design.
- 'The eligibility rules are fair'.
- 'The procedures for application are easy'.
- 'The rules and requirements are easy to understand'.
- 'The intended environmental benefits are clear and easy
to understand'.
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Table I (cont'd).
Variable Description Average SD I
Preference stable policy
Social capital
Trust general
Participation social
organizations
Participation agricultural
organizations
Case study area dummies
Frysl:ln (the Netherlands)
Flanders (Belgium)
Czech Republic
Finland
Basse-Normandie (France)
Emilia Romagna (Italy)
- 'It is easy to find the right person in the
administration to contact when there are problems'.
- 'Regarding AES, administration behaviour is fair
and responsible'.
Dummy indicating that farmers believe that the current 0.25
policy rules and regulations will remain constant
over a longer period.
Dummy indicating that 'Generally speaking, most 0.74
people can be trusted.'
Dummy indicating that farmer often participates in 0.42
activities of non-agricultural organizations like sports
clubs and clubs focused on community work.
Dummy indicating that farmer often participates in 0.31
agricultural organization (farmers union and local farmers'
groups mainly oriented at improving agriculture).
Dummy indicating case study area Frysl:ln. 0.12
Dummy indicating case study area Flanders. 0.24
Dummy indicating case study area Czech Republic. 0.15
Dummy indicating case study area Finland. 0.09
Dummy indicating case study area Basse-Normandie. 0.27
Dummy indicating case study area Emilia Romagna. 0.13
I SD ~ standard deviation.
2 SGM ~ The Standard Gross Margin (SGM) of a crop or livestock unit is defined as the value of output
from one hectare or from one animal minus the cost of variable inputs required to produce that output.
For each region all crop and livestock units are accorded an SGM. To avoid bias caused by fluctuations,
e.g., in production (due to bad weather) or in input/output prices, three-year averages are taken.
In addition, farmers were asked about how they managed their contracts and their
required farming practices.
From the questionnaire several variables were derived. They described the farming
family (education level and age), their production system (e.g., farm legal status, farm
size in Standard Gross Margins (SGM; for definition see Table I)) the use of extension
services, trust in the government and institutional design, and social capital (trust and
participation in networks). The latter three sets ofvariables are important motivation
variables. Table I gives an overview of the data used for the estimation.
We distinguished three groups of contracts: (I) focusing on landscape management,
(2) on biodiversity protection, and (3) on the restriction of intensive practices (Bonnieux
et a!., 2002). These groups were homogeneous with respect to the type of contract
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requirements. Landscape management focused on the maintenance oflandscape
elements. Biodiversity protection referred to extensive management of grassland and
management to promote flora and fauna. Winter cover on arable land and reduced use
of fertilizers are examples of the restriction of intensive practices.
Farm and farmer characteristics are relevant for the uptake ofAESs. From previous
studies it follows that farm size and farm type influence the uptake of AESs (e.g., Wynn
et a!., ZOO1; Vanslembrouck et a!., zooz). The type of service delivered by the farmer
varies according to the farming system. Implementing a biodiversity protection contract
on a specialized dairy farm will be different from implementing the same contract on
a specialized arable farm. Farmers who develop their farm in a direction not related to
AESs are expected to be less willing to be involved in agri-environmental contracts. Also
Wynn et a!. (ZOOI) show the importance of the 'fit' of the scheme with the farm.
Based on the literature, we included a number of farmer characteristics in the
model (e.g., Wilson, 1997; Rizov, zo04). Dummy variables for age and education were
added to the model. Reference categories for age and education were dropped from the
model in order to avoid a dummy trap (Woolridge, zo06). Moreover, a variable for off-
farm income was added to represent labour availability. According to Jongeneel et a!.
(zo08) it was expected that if non-farming income is important a farmer is more likely
to enroll in agri-environmental schemes.
Private as well as public extension services are expected to influence uptake.
The questions on extension services did not focus on AESs and were formulated in
general terms. It can be expected that information on AESs was only part of these
extension services. Private extension is provided by feed suppliers, banks, researchers,
and processing industries. Public extension will include the complete range of
governmental regulation including AESs so that a positive influence is expected on
the uptake ofAES. Given the nature of private extension (focused on general farming
practices) it is expected that this will negatively influence the uptake ofAES. A positive
assessment of institutional design is expected to increase the uptake ofAES.
Social capital is measured using the following indicators: (I) trust in general, (z)
participation in social networks, and (3) participation in agricultural networks. Higher
levels oftrust in general and trust in the government in particular (as contracting partner)
are expected to enhance the uptake. The social networks are more general networks not
related to agriculture but, for example, to involvement in sports clubs. Agricultural networks
focus on improving agricultural practices. The more general networks are thought to
increase the probability ofuptake ofAESs because the farmers concerned feel a large social
responsibility. Participation in agricultural networks is expected to negatively influence
uptake because the farmers are more oriented towards improving agricultural operation.
Country specificities, including characteristics of sampling in each case study, were
taken into account through country dummies. The dummies were introduced as control
variables. The Netherlands was taken as reference.
Results
The results of the estimations are presented in Table z. The likelihood of participation
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Table 2. Estimation results of multivariate probit model (n ~ 990).
Independent variable
Farm characteristics
Specialization dairy farming
Specialization beef farming
Farm size
Trajectory
Future
Intensity
Farmer characteristics
Age between 40 and 55
Age older than 55
Medium education
High education
Off-farm income
Extension services
Public extension
Private extension
Landscape
management
0.001 5
-0.094
-0.001 5
0.05 8 **
-0.061
-0.03 0
0.053
-0.046
0.073
0.13
0.031
0.25 **
0.15
Biodiversity
protection
0.0047 **
0.003 2
-0.0018
0.042
0.073
-0.12
-0.05 0
O.Il
0.095
0.02 9
0.19 *
-0.16
Restriction of
intensive practices
-0.005 8 ***
0.0035
-0.0012
0.083 ***
-0.034
-0.083
-0·35 ***
0.083
0.15
0.3 2 **
0.3 6 ***
-0.17 *
Trust in government and institutional design
Trust government -O.OIl
Institutional design 0.15
Preference stable policy 0.050
-0.022
0·45 ***
0.3 8 ***
0.21 **
0.12 ***
0.037
Social capital
Trust general
Participation social organizations
Participation agricultural
organizations
Case-study area dummies
Flanders (Belgium)
Czech Republic
Finland
Basse-Normandie (France)
Emilia Romagna (Italy)
Constant
-0.014
0.24 **
-0.25**
-0.00054
-0.19
-1.49 ***
0.24
0.039
-1.89 ***
0.018
0.082
-0.15 *
-0.08 9
-1.90 ***
-0.84 ***
0.080
-1.IO ***
-2.02 ***
-0.012
0.27 ***
-0.28 ***
0.25
0.022
0·75 ***
-0.5 0 ***
-0.48 **
-0.80 *
I Statistical significance: * ~ P < O.IO; ** ~ P < 0.05; *** ~ P < 0.01.
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in landscape management and biodiversity protection is positively related to
specialization in dairy farming. Specialized dairy farmers are less likely to be involved
in less intensive practices. The trajectory of the farm - the number of changes in
farming practices not related to AES - has a positive effect on the likelihood of
enrolling in landscape management and restriction of intensive practices. The intensity
of the farm has no effect on the uptake oflandscape management contracts (this
variable was not included in the other equations). The future of the farm (whether the
farmer expects his farm to be continued for the coming 10 years) has no statistically
significant effect. Older farmers are less likely to enroll in contracts for restricting
intensive practices. A large share of off-farm labour income makes contracts for
restricting intensive practices more likely.
The perception of the institutional design has positive effects on participation in
biodiversity and less intensive practices contracts. If farmers think that a stable policy is
important they are more likely to be involved in biodiversity protection.
Trust in general has no effect on participation. Trust in the government only
favours participation of farmers in contracts for restrictions on intensive practices.
Participation in social organizations has positive effects on uptake oflandscape
maintenance and restriction on intensive practices contracts. Participation in
organizations focused on improving farming has a negative impact on enrolling for
the same contract types. Public extension services positively influence the uptake of
all contract types. Furthermore, private extension services have a negative effect on
the uptake of restricting intensive practices contracts. Farm size, intensity, and the
future of the farm have no effect. A stable policy - i.e., no time inconsistency of the
government - has a positive effect on participation for biodiversity protection contracts.
The country dummies illustrate differences related to case-study specific factors such
as the regional institutional environment, history and geographical characteristics of
a case study area. We find evidence of correlation between the contracting decisions:
the error terms between landscape management and biodiversity protection (Pr,z)
are positively correlated and the error terms between biodiversity protection and
restriction of intensive practices (Pr,3) are positively correlated. Finally, the error terms
between biodiversity protection and restriction of intensive practices are positively
correlated (PZ,3)' The correlation coefficients are respectively 0.41,0.38 and 0.38.
These coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The likelihood ratio test
statistics suggest that Pr,z ~ Pr,3 ~ PZ ,3 can be rejected at the I percent significance level
(LR-X'~ 105.61).
Discussion and conclusions
Contract choice was described and analysed using a trivariate probit model. The model
examined the influence of farmer and farm characteristics and motivational factors like
institutional design ofcontracts, extension services, and social capital, to identify statistically
significant variables related to the adoption ofdifferent contract types. Our results confirm
earlier findings about the influence offarm and farmers' characteristics on the uptake of
agri-environmental contracts (e.g., Crabtree et a!., 1998; Wynn et a!., 2001).
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Most previous studies did not take into account motivational aspects about institutional
design and social capital. First of all, these variables significantly affect the choice
of some contract types but do not influence the choice of other ones. For example,
participation in social networks is important for landscape management and for
restrictions on intensive land use practices but is not important for biodiversity
protection. Secondly, decisions to participate in more than one contract type are not
taken independently. Farmers combine different contract types.
The results of the analysis are important in terms of policy design. They indicate
that the implementation of a restricted intensive practices contract on specialized dairy
farms is different from that on less specialized farms. This suggests that contracts have
to be clearly targeted to well-specified transactions and have to take the characteristics
of the farm and the farmer into account. This will increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of the policy.
The results show the importance of institutional design. A negative farmer's
perception of the institutional design can prevent him from contracting. The results
furthermore suggest that public extension services can enhance the uptake and
overcome negative perceptions. To enhance the uptake extension services should focus
on the way AESs are being perceived. Trust in the government also increases uptake.
Trust is a necessary condition of contracting, a conclusion that is in line with Klein
Woolthuis et al. (zooS). It means that well designed contracts cannot completely replace
a lack of trust of farmers in the government. In short, the uptake can be increased by
paying more attention to the motivational aspects of the institutional design of the
contracts and by maintaining and developing trustworthiness.
Finally, our paper shows the importance of social capital for the uptake ofAESs.
Farmers who are frequently engaged in non-agricultural networks are more likely to
be involved in AES. This implies that not only financial concerns are important for the
uptake of agri-environmental schemes but also that farmers are influenced by their
social networks, underlining the importance of internal motivation and responsible
entrepreneurship and showing the importance of non-monetary benefits of being
involved in AESs. Farmers who only participate in general farming networks are less
likely to be involved in AES. Apparently, they have other preferences.
The analysis is subject to some qualifications. First, we only modelled a limited
number of different contract types. Besides, only groups of similar contracts with
different characteristics were analysed. This could have led to aggregation errors.
Second, other factors, e.g., preferences for contract terms like contract duration and
payment levels not included in the model, might have played a role in contract choice.
Despite these qualifications the approach discussed contributes to the existing
literature because it makes it possible to determine the farmers' choice between
different contract types. It introduces institutional preferences, public extension
services, trust in the government and social capital. Given the farm-specific/contract-
specific outcomes, the survey and model can help to better understand reasons why
farms conclude a specific contract. This information is relevant given the larger
emphasis the ED is putting on quantifying the effects of agri-environmental policies.
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Note
This paper presents results obtained within the EU project SSPE-CT-2003-502070 on Integrated Tools
design and implement Agro Environmental Schemes (ITAES) <http//:merlin.lusignan.inra.fr/ITAES>.
The survey referred to in this paper was carried out within this project. The authors' conclusions do not
necessarily reflect the view of the European Union and in no way anticipate the Commission's future
policy in this area.
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